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THE CONSTRUCTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
OF INSURANCE POLICIES THAT PROVIDE
COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGE
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Shane v. Rhines, 1 four current justices2 of the Alaska Supreme
Court noted that evidence of insurance coverage may be relevant to
the appropriate measure of punitive damages in a civil lawsuit.3 In so
doing, the Shane court implicitly adopted the view that at least some
insurance liability contracts could be construed to provide insurance
coverage for punitive damage awards, 4 although it did not address the
question of whether such coverage would be consistent with insurance
contract law or public policy in the state of Alaska.
This article explores several issues raised in Shane v. Rhines. Sec-
tion II of this article discusses the Shane decision in detail, outlining
the positions of the various justices in the per curiam opinion, as well
as in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Section III addresses the
propriety of insurance coverage for punitive damage awards under in-
surance contract law, as well as the public policy implications of insur-
ance coverage for punitive damage awards. Finally, Section IV briefly
explains the rationale for, and manner in which, insurance coverage
for punitive damage awards should be considered by the fact finder.
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1. 672 P.2d 895 (Alaska 1983).
2. The case was heard before Chief Justice Burke, Justice Compton, Justice Mat-
thews, Justice Rabinowitz and Alaska Court of Appeals Judge Singleton. Judge Sin-
gleton was sitting by assignment pursuant to section 16 of article IV of the Alaska
Constitution. ALASKA CONsT. art. IV, § 16 (1959, amended 1970). Judge Singleton
has since been appointed to the federal district court for Alaska.
3. Shane, 672 P.2d at 900.
4. Id.
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II. SHANE v. RHINES
A. Factual Background
Shane arose out of an auto accident in October of 1978. 5 At trial,
the defendant Rhines admitted- that he had been drinking prior to the
accident and that he was "responsible" for the accident;6 thus, his lia-
bility for wrongful conduct was not at issue. The plaintiff Shane had
sued Rhines for both compensatory and punitive damages, but the
jury determined that Shane was not entitled to punitive damages.7 On
appeal, Shane challenged, inter alia, the trial court ruling that Rhines's
insurance coverage was inadmissible as evidence of Rhines's financial
condition.8 Shane challenged this exclusion of evidence in part be-
cause Rhines had himself presented evidence of his limited financial
resources to demonstrate his inability to pay a punitive damage
award.9 Shane argued that, likewise, the purpose of his introducing
the policy would have been "to establish Rhines's ability to pay puni-
tive damages." 10
Against this backdrop the Alaska Supreme Court implied that
insurance coverage may be relevant to the appropriate measure of pu-
nitive damage awards.
B. Per Curiam Implications of Shane
In its analysis of the contentions of Shane regarding insurance
coverage, the per curiam portion of Shane raised two significant issues
about insurance coverage for punitive damage awards.
First, and perhaps most significant to those representing insur-
ance companies, Shane implied that insurance coverage for punitive
damage awards is not per se violative of insurance contract law, or
public policy. This view allowed the Shane court to reach the express
issue regarding the admissibility of such policies, because the Shane
court could not even address the issue of admissibility without first
accepting that some insurance policies provide coverage for punitive
damage awards.
At the trial court level, the jury was given a special verdict form
that asked two separate questions: (1) whether Shane was entitled to
punitive damages, and (2) the appropriate amount of those damages."
5. Id. at 897.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 899.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id.
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The jury answered "no" to the threshold question, effectively ren-
dering the remaining question of "amount" irrelevant.' 2 As to liabil-
ity for punitive damages, Shane held that the admission of insurance
coverage for punitive damages was precluded in that context.13
"Although evidence of insurance arguably is relevant to the appropri-
ate measure of punitive damages, it is not relevant to the threshold
question of whether a party's conduct is so reprehensible that punish-
ment is necessary or whether punitive damages will deter others from
engaging in similar conduct."' 14 This conclusion implicitly demon-
strates the court's view that insurance coverage for punitive damage
awards is consistent with Alaska insurance contract law.
The Shane court's second conclusion is that insurance coverage
for punitive damage awards is relevant to the "appropriate measure"'15
of punitive damages. This conclusion, analyzed in Section IV, proba-
bly has more significance to those representing plaintiffs in personal
injury actions, and has the potential to alter radically the fact finder's
task in determining the size of punitive damage awards vWhen insur-
ance coverage for such awards exists.' 6
C. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justice Compton wrote a concurrence to the Shane per curiam
opinion.' 7 Justice Burke wrote a partial concurrence/partial dissent to
the per curiam decision, in which Justice Matthews joined.' 8 Each of
the separate opinions, however, actually provides further support for
the per curiam conclusions outlined above, with relatively minor dif-
ferences as to procedure and application of the principles in the trial
court context.
In his concurrence, Justice Compton further emphasized the por-
tion of the opinion dealing with the admission of insurance policies:
"[W]hen punitive damages are at issue, evidence of the defendant's
wealth, including any insurance, is relevant to determining what
amount should be awarded so as to fulfill the purposes of punishment
12. Id.
13. The court cited Alaska Rule of Evidence 411. Rule 411 provides in part:
Evidence that a person was or was not insured against liability is not admis-
sible upon the issue whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrongfully.
This rule does not require the exclusion of evidence of insurance against
liability when offered for another purpose, such as proof of agency, owner-
ship, or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness.
ALASKA R. EVID. 411.
14. Shane, 672 P.2d at 900.
15. Id.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 59-66.
17. Shane, 672 P.2d at 901-02 (Compton, J., concurring).
18. Id. at 902-03 (Burke, C.J., and Mathews, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
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and deterrence." 19 This statement buttresses the admissibility of in-
surance coverage for punitive damage awards, and also implicitly con-
cedes, as did the per curiam majority, that such coverage is permissible
under Alaska law.20
The partial dissent written by Justice Burke provides further sup-
port for the per curiam opinion as it relates to the admission of insur-
ance policies and the policy reasons behind such admission:
The purpose of introducing the insurance policy was to establish
Rhines' ability to pay punitive damages. Evidence of the defend-
ant's financial condition is admissible to determine how large a pu-
nitive damage must be to achieve the purposes of punishment and
deterrence. A defendant's insurance policy is a part of his financial
resources and will obviously affect the degree to which a defendant
is punished by a punitive damage award. 21
Thus, the conclusions of the per curiam majority are emphasized and
supported by the separate opinions of Chief Justice Burke and Justice
Matthews. Indeed, the concurrences to the per curiam decision pro-
vide stronger support for the court's conclusions regarding the con-
struction and admissibility of insurance coverage for punitive damage
awards.
D. Summary
A close reading of Shane v. Rhines reveals that four current jus-
tices22 of the Alaska Supreme Court are willing to accept the proposi-
tion that insurance coverage for punitive damages is relevant to the
appropriate measure or size of the punitive damage award. The re-
maining sections of this article will examine insurance contract law
and other evidentiary implications of this proposition.
III. THE INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS: THE
TENSION BETWEEN INSURANCE CONTRACT LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY
A. Introduction
As was discussed in Section II, the Alaska Supreme Court implic-
itly accepted in Shane v. Rhines the idea that insurance coverage for
punitive damage awards is consistent with insurance contract law and
19. Id. at 901 (Compton, J., concurring).
20. The primary emphasis of Justice Compton's concurrence regarded the issue of
bifurcation of the punitive damage and compensatory damage components at trial
pursuant to Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). The bifurcation issue is addressed
in detail infra notes 72-73.
21. 672 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (Burke, C.J., dissenting
in part).
22. See supra note 2.
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public policy in the state of Alaska. There are sound reasons to sup-
port a conclusion that insurance coverage for punitive damage awards
is proper under Alaska law. This Section will now address each of the
components of the insurance coverage issue in detail.
The question of whether liability insurance coverage extends to
conduct that may lead to potential punitive damage awards has been
the subject of much debate and commentary throughout the coun-
try.2 3 Although no uniform rule is applied across jurisdictions, there
does appear to be a consistent methodology used by courts in address-
ing this insurance coverage issue. First, courts typically examine the
language of the insurance policy in light of insurance contract law to
determine whether there is an unambiguous exclusion of coverage for
punitive awards. Second, courts then determine whether the public
policy of the subject forum, notwithstanding the language of the insur-
ance contract, allows coverage for punitive damage awards.24
The remainder of the Section will analyze the question of cover-
age for punitive awards under the methodology used by most courts
that have addressed this issue.
B. Under Alaska Law, a Failure to Expressly Exclude Punitive
Damage Awards Should Lead to a Finding of Coverage
for Such Awards Under the Insurance Contract
One of the fundamental principles of Alaska insurance law re-
garding insurance coverage is that "provisions of [insurance] coverage
should be construed broadly while exclusions are interpreted narrowly
against the insured."' 25 The most significant terms of an insurance
contract for the purpose of this article relate to the kinds of damages
covered by the policy, and whether the policy contains an express ex-
clusion for punitive awards.
The Alaska Supreme Court has held that insurance policy provi-
sions that require an insurer to "pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages"
can include the payment of punitive damage awards.26 In Providence
Washington Insurance Co. v. City of Valdez, the court held:
23. See, e.g., King, The Insurability of Punitive Damages: A New Solution to an
Old Dilemma, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 345 (1980); Annotation, Liability Insurance
Coverage as Extending to Liability for Punitive or Exemplary Damages, 16 A.L.R. 4th
11 (1982) [hereinafter Liability Insurance Coverage].
24. See generally 2 L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 15.2(B)
(2d ed. 1989) (outlining methodology of courts addressing this issue).
25. Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 145 (Alaska 1976).
26. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 (Alaska
1984); accord LeDoux v. Continental Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 178, 180 (D. Alaska
1987).
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Punitive damages, where reduced to judgment, constitute a "sum"
that the insured is obligated to pay as a result of its wrongful evic-
tion. Under the terms of the policy Providence has not specifically
excluded punitive damages. We therefore conclude that the liability
policy Providence issued to Valdez provides coverage for punitive
damages.
27
Thus, under Alaska law, an insurer's promise to pay "damages" in-
cludes the promise to pay punitive damages, unless otherwise ex-
pressly excluded.
An insurer's promise to pay all "damages" may nevertheless con-
tain certain exclusions involving various kinds of conduct by the in-
sured. For instance, most insurance policies include exclusions for
conduct "by or at the direction of the insured, ' 28 that is, intentional
conduct. A policy may also exclude "malicious, criminal or fraudu-
lent conduct. ' 29 Significantly, however, many insurance policies do
not contain exclusions related to unintentional or reckless conduct. 30
The distinction between intentional and unintentional conduct as
related to the construction of an insurance policy's coverage for puni-
tive damages was analyzed in detail in LeDoux v. Continental Insur-
ance Co. 31 LeDoux involved an auto accident in which the plaintiffs
alleged that the defendant had failed to keep a proper outlook, had
failed to stop at a stop sign and was speeding.32 The plaintiffs in Le-
Doux sought a declaratory judgment that their policy provided cover-
age for punitive damages for "gross negligence. '33 The Federal
District Court for the District of Alaska, applying Alaska law, consid-
ered whether conduct alleged to be "outrageous, [and] of reckless in-
difference," or demonstrating "gross negligence" was covered by an
liability insurance policy. 34 Judge Boochever, sitting from the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals by designation, stated:
The policy excepts injury "that is expected or intended" by the in-
sured. Here there is no allegation that Curt LeDoux expected or
intended to injure the Van Scoyks. If Continental wished to exclude
27. Id. at 863 (footnote omitted).
28. King, supra note 23, at 359 n.61.
29. Id.
30. Under Alaska law, wrongful conduct need not be intentional in order to jus-
tify a punitive damage award. See Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc. v. Kavorkian, 727
P.2d 1038, 104.8-49 (Alaska 1986) (holding that punitive damages will be awarded
where wrongdoer's conduct can be characterized as outrageous: malicious, done with
bad motive or recklessly indifferent to interests of another); Zeman v. Lufthansa Ger-
man Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1286 (Alaska 1985) (holding that to support an award of
punitive damages, the conduct must be outrageous: malicious acts, or acts done with
reckless indifference to the interest of another).
31. 666 F. Supp. 178 (D. Alaska 1987).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 179.
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all coverage for punitive damages it would have been a simple mat-
ter to express that intention. At best the clause is ambiguous, and
Alaska, like the vast majority of jurisdictions, construes an ambigu-
ous provision against the insurer.35
Based upon the LeDoux reasoning, an insurance contract that does not
expressly exclude coverage for reckless conduct and/or gross negli-
gence will also lead to a finding of coverage for punitive damage
awards.
Under the above methodology, the language of the insurance pol-
icy must be looked at to determine the precise nature of damages
against which it insures, as well as whether there is an unambiguous
exclusion for all punitive awards. Thus, it is very likely that within the
current trend of Alaska insurance law, reckless conduct which leads to
a punitive damage award will be covered by a liability insurance policy
that does not expressly exclude coverage for such behavior.
C. Public Policy Should Not Eliminate Coverage for Punitive
Damages in the Absence of an Express Exclusion for Such
Damages
Once a court determines that the language of the insurance policy
does not exclude coverage for punitive awards, it must then determine
whether such coverage violates the public policy of Alaska.3 6
A leading case in favor of the position that allowing insurance
coverage for punitive damages violates public policy is Northwestern
National Casualty Co. v. McNulty. 37 In McNulty, Judge Wisdom,
writing for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, analyzed an insurance
contract that obliged the insurer "[t]o pay on behalf of the insured all
sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages ....
Judge Wisdom reasoned that if such language provided insurance
coverage for punitive damage awards, the provision would violate pub-
lic policy:
35. Id. at 180 (citing Hahn v. Alaska Title Guar. Co., 557 P.2d 143, 144-45
(Alaska 1976)).
36. In McKnight v. Rice, Hoppner, Brown & Brunner, the Alaska Supreme
Court reaffirmed that otherwise valid contracts will be unenforceable when they are
found to violate public policy: "To determine whether an agreement is inoperative on
grounds of public policy requires that a balance be struck between public policy inter-
ests against enforcement and the interests favoring enforcement." 678 P.2d 1330,
1334 (Alaska 1984) (footnote omitted). See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
TRACTS § 178 (1981).
37. 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962), cited in Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. City
of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 n.5 (Alaska 1984) (using substantially similar language).
38. Id. at 433. Judge Wisdom did not address the contract interpretation issue
analyzed supra at Section III.B.
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The policy considerations in a state where ... punitive damages are
awarded for punishment and deterrence, would seem to require that
the damages rest ultimately as well [as] nominally on the party actu-
ally responsible for the wrong. If that person were permitted to
shift the burden to an insurance company, punitive damages would
serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not compensate the
plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages already have
made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point in punishing the
insurance company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact, of course,
and considering the extent to which the public is insured, the bur-
den would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance companies
but on the public, since the added liability to the insurance compa-
nies would be passed along to the premium payers. Society would
then be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the insured.
39
Substantial support can be found for the McNulty rationale in other
jurisdictions.4°
The LeDoux decision, discussed above, held that coverage for pu-
nitive awards resulting from unintentional torts does not violate the
public policy of Alaska.4 1 The majority of courts that have addressed
this issue have held similarly.
42
A number of reasons support the conclusion in LeDoux that in-
surance coverage for punitive damages is compatible with Alaska pub-
lic policy. First, in the absence of a clear legislative or constitutional
declaration of public policy, Alaska law does not interfere lightly with
contractual rights because the judicial enforcement of contracts as
written is itself an important public policy. Second, because most in-
surance policies exclude coverage for intentionally tortious conduct,
any public policy arguments that normally might justify voiding provi-
sions in insurance contracts related to intentional conduct are substan-
tially diminished. Third, the failure to enforce an insurance contract
39. McNulty, 307 F.2d at 440-41.
40. See, ag., Wojciak v. Northern Package Corp., 310 N.W.2d 675, 679-80
(Minn. 1981); Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Goldfarb, 53 N.Y.2d 392, 400, 475 N.E.2d
810, 814, 442 N.Y.S.2d 422, 426 (1981); and cases cited in Liability Insurance Cover-
age, supra note 23. In Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. City of Valdez, the Alaska
Supreme Court expressly refused to decide the public policy component of insurance
for punitive damages when it reasoned: "Assuming, without deciding, that public
policy in Alaska would prohibit liability insurance coverage for punitive damages, we
hold that such a policy would not prohibit municipal corporations from insuring
against punitive damage awards." Id. at 863 (Alaska 1984) (footnote omitted).
41. LeDoux, 666 F. Supp. at 180.
42. See, e.g., General Casualty Co. v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956);
Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621, 319 S.E.2d 217 (1984); Dayton
Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980); Harrell
v. Traveler's Indem. Co., 279 Or. 199, 567 P.2d 1013 (1977); Carroway v. Johnson,
245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W. Va. 172, 283
S.E.2d 227 (1981).
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as written presents an unwarranted windfall to insurance companies.
Insurance policies are typically form contracts provided by the in-
surer; therefore, insurance companies should be forced to bear the risk
of failing to expressly exclude punitive damage award coverage. Fi-
nally, the dual purposes of punitive damages, that is, punishment and
deterrence, are not impeded substantially by insurance coverage for
punitive awards that apply only to unintentional torts. Each of these
reasons supporting the LeDoux rationale is discussed separately below.
1. The Public Policy Behind Judicial Enforcement of Contract
Rights Should Not Be Overridden. When one considers the public
policy reasons for voiding a contract or contractual provision, it must
be emphasized that, by necessary implication, there has already been a
determination that a valid agreement between the parties exists. This
determination is significant because important public policy reasons
require judicial enforcement of contracts valid as written. The Alaska
Supreme Court has emphasized this point in the following manner:
In considering this first question [of whether a contract provision is
void as against public policy] we start with the basic tenet that com-
petent parties are free to make contracts and that they should be
bound by their agreements. In the absence of a constitutional provi-
sion or statute which makes certain contracts illegal or unenforce-
able, we believe it is the function of the judiciary to allow men to
manage their own affairs in their own way. As a matter of judicial
policy the court should maintain and enforce contracts, rather than
enable parties to escape from the obligations they have chosen to
incur.43
There is no constitutional provision or statute in Alaska that makes
the coverage of punitive damages by insurance policies void on the
basis of public policy.44 Therefore, these contracts should, at the out-
set, be presumptively valid and enforceable.
In the punitive damage/insurance contract context, the- Oregon
Supreme Court framed the same point as follows:
It is important to bear in mind at the outset that this case does not
involve the application of any settled and established rule of con-
tract "public policy," but the adoption in Oregon of a proposed new
rule of "public policy" under which both existing and future insur-
ance contracts which undertake to provide protection from liability
for punitive damages would be held to be invalid.
It has been said of "public policy" as a ground for invalidation
by the courts of private contracts that "those two alliterative words
43. Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498, 500 (Alaska 1962) (emphasis
added) (footnotes omitted). See also Horton v. Hanson, 722 P.2d 211, 216 (Alaska
1986).
44. See LeDoux, 666 F. Supp. at 180.
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are often used as if they had a magic quality and were self-explana-
tory . . ." and that for a court to undertake to invalidate private
contracts upon the ground of "public policy" is to mount "a very
unruly horse, and when you once get astride it, you never know
where it will carry you."' 45
In Alaska it is settled and well established that public policy favors the
enforcement of contracts as written.46 In the absence of a legislative,
or similarly objective determination of public policy demonstrating
otherwise, that policy should not be overridden. 47
2. Coverage for Punitive Damage Awards Based Upon Uninten-
tional Torts Should Not Be Considered a Violation of Public Pol-
icy. Many courts that have considered the public policy implications
of insurance coverage for punitive damages have found determinative
the question of whether the conduct insured against was intentional or
unintentional. In St. Paul Mercury Insurance Co. v. Duke University,48
for example, the court found that insurance coverage for intentional
wrongdoing would be violative of public policy.49 The LeDoux court
similarly examined intent and held that coverage for unintentional
torts would not violate public policy. 50
A focus on intent is appropriate because it goes to the heart of the
justification for allowing insurance coverage for unintentional conduct
in general. The terms of liability policies normally are not rendered
void simply because the policy insures against negligent or grossly neg-
ligent conduct. Professor Corbin has argued:
Liability insurance policies, taken out by employers, owners of
automobiles, and others, are contracts for indemnity against conse-
quences of tortious negligence on the part of servants and employ-
ees. Such contracts are not made illegal by the fact that they
45. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Or. 1977) (en banc)
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1375 (1062), and 14 WIL-
LISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1629 (3d ed. 1972)).
46. Inman, 369 P.2d at 500 (Alaska 1962).
47. LeDoux, 666 F. Supp. at 180-81. "Another question would be presented if
Alaska's legislature were to declare such insurance provisions invalid. But the legisla-
ture of this state has not enacted a provision.., that bars recovery from an insurer for
intentional harm caused by an insured." Id.
48. 670 F. Supp. 630, 636 (M.D.N.C. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 849
F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1988).
49. Id. The court also noted that "[t]he notion of spreading the risk of punitive
damages through insurance is more palatable in the arena of negligent conduct than in
the arena of intentionally tortious conduct, which by definition requires the intent to
cause the tortiously proscribed result with its concommitant heightened level of culpa-
bility." Id.
50. 666 F. Supp. at 180.
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provide for indemnity against consequences of the negligent con-
duct of the employer or owner himself. It is not believed that harm-
ful negligence is made more probable by such indemnification
51
A number of strong policy concerns may compel a court to void
coverage for punitive awards based upon intentional conduct.5 2 These
concerns, however, do not transfer into the area of unintentional torts.
As the LeDoux court said, "[i]n the absence of a defendant intending
or expecting to injure another or to damage property, the public policy
favoring punishment and deterrence is not sufficiently strong to justify
nullification of contractual rights."'53
3. The "Nullification" of Contractual Rights Between the Insurer
and the Insured Creates an Unjustified Windfall to Insurers. Even if
a sound basis could be found in public policy for disregarding the in-
surance contract that provides for punitive damages, there is neverthe-
less an important reason for enforcing the contract between insurer
and insured as written: insurance companies should be required to
honor their obligations and should not be allowed to reap windfalls at
the expense of their insureds.54 When a premium for insurance has
been paid by the insured, and protection has been tendered by the in-
surer, denial of coverage (by courts or the insurance company) consti-
tutes nothing less than a windfall to insurance companies for failing to
exclude punitive damages from coverage:
It is one thing for an insurance company to write a policy with pro-
visions which exclude liability for punitive damages and to ask that
this court construe and apply such policy provisions. It is quite an-
other thing, however, for an insurance company which has written
and issued an insurance policy in terms which include coverage for
punitive damages - presumably at a premium which the insurance
company believed to be sufficient as consideration for such coverage
- to ask... [a] court to relieve it from such liability under its own
insurance contract by a judicial declaration that the contract is void
for reasons of "public policy."'55
51. 6A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1421 (1962). See also Harrell v. Travelers In-
dem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1016 (Or. 1977) (en bane).
52. Indeed, coverage for such conduct seems to undercut the policy that underlies
punitive damages. See King, supra note 23, at 345.
53. 666 F. Supp, at 180.
54. See, e.g., Price v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 502 P.2d 522, 525 (Ariz.
1972) (noting that one component of a public policy inquiry is that an insurance com-
pany which takes a premium to cover all liability for damages should honor its
obligations).
55. Harrell v. Travelers Indem. Co., 567 P.2d 1013, 1021-22 (Or. 1977) (en bane)
(footnote omitted). See also LeDoux, 666 F. Supp. at 180 ("In the absence of a provi-
sion excluding punitive damages the insurance company is receiving premiums to
cover these claims. Contracts should be enforced unless there is a strong public policy
to the contrary.").
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If the insurer drafts an insurance contract that does not exclude
coverage for punitive damages, and further fails to exclude coverage
for reckless conduct, Alaska law should require the insurer to pay for
such an award. The simple alternative to this proposition is that in-
surance companies draft their contracts to exclude all punitive damage
exposure under the policy.
4. The Goals of Punishment and Deterrence Are Not Diminished by
Coverage for Punitive Damage Awards Based Only Upon Unintentional
Conduct. The twofold purpose of punishment and deterrence is not
vitiated by the coverage of punitive awards for unintentional torts. As
the LeDoux court noted: "There are ... collateral consequences of
punitive damage awards that still further these objectives. Such an
award carries with it a degree of opprobrium, affects the ability of the
insured to obtain automobile liability insurance, and is apt to increase
the rates tortfeasors are charged for insurance in the future."'5 6 The
collateral consequences of punitive damage awards, in combination
with the strong public policy behind enforcing contracts, further sup-
port the enforcement of the insurance contract.
D. Conclusion
Sound policy reasons to support LeDoux persist even in light of
the McNulty rationale for voiding insurance provisions on the basis of
public policy. Although the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed
directly this public policy issue, the Shane v. Rhines decision supports,
at least implicitly, the LeDoux conclusion that insurance coverage for
punitive damage awards is not per se violative of public policy.5 7
IV. THE RATIONALE AND MANNER IN WHICH INSURANCE
COVERAGE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS SHOULD
BE CONSIDERED BY THE FACT FINDER
If indeed an insurance contract can be interpreted to provide cov-
erage for punitive damage awards, 58 Shane v. Rhines demonstrates
56. 666 F. Supp. at 180. See also Price, 502 P.2d at 524.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 11-16.
58. Given the relatively clear guidelines in Alaska law regarding interpretation of
insurance contracts, the insurance company's failure to expressly exclude punitive
damage awards, for the reasons discussed supra text accompanying notes 43-56,
should render the insurance contract presumptively enforceable as written. A plaintiff
may nevertheless seek declaratory relief as to this issue when the insurance contract is
ambiguous. See Jefferson v. Asplund, 458 P.2d 995, 999 (Alaska 1969) (Declaratory
action is limited to no particular class of cases, and is confined to no special type of
litigation. Its scope is pervasive.); ALASKA STAT. § 22.10.020(g) (1988) ("[T]he supe-
rior court ... may declare the rights and legal relations of an interested party seeking
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that such coverage is relevant to the appropriate measure of punitive
damages.
A. The Relevance of Insurance Coverage to Punitive Damage
Awards
The purpose of punitive damages under Alaska law is to punish
the wrongdoer and deter others like him from repeating the offensive
act.59 Evidence of a defendant's financial condition normally is admis-
sible to aid the fact finder in determining the size of a punitive damage
award.60 For this reason, a defendant's tax returns are admissible as
evidence of a defendant's wealth in order to assist the fact finder in
determining the size of the punitive damage award.61
As a general rule, however, the existence of the terms of an insur-
ance policy are not admissible regarding the threshold issue of whether
an individual acted negligently or wrongfully. 62 When not offered to
demonstrate liability, the existence of the terms of the policy are in-
deed admissible.63 Several commentators have argued that Federal
Rule of Evidence 411 allows the admission of an insurance policy to
determine the wealth of the defendant in the punitive damage setting.
For instance, Professor Rothstein has said that "in cases coming
within the exception expressed by the last sentence of [Rule 411], a
judgment has been made that the benefits of admitting the evidence
may outweigh the dangers... ."64 Therefore, argues Professor Roth-
stein, "financial condition, including insurance, may be allowed to be
shown on the issue of punitive damages (i.e., to allow the damages to be
tailored properly to "'sting")."65
the declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. The declaration
has the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and is reviewable as such.").
59. Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. City of Valdez, 684 P.2d 861, 863 (Alaska
1984).
60. See, e.g., Clary Ins. Agency v. Doyle, 620 P.2d 194, 205 (Alaska 1980) (noting
that factors determining size of punitive damage awards are, inter alia, the wealth of
the defendant).
61. See, e.g., Leidhold v. District Court, 619 P.2d 768, 769-71 (Colo. 1980) (hold-
ing that gross income as shown by defendant's tax returns is discoverable regarding
wealth of defendant when prima facie proof of triable issue on issue of liability for
punitive damages is established by the plaintiff).
62. ALASKA R. EVID. 411; see supra text accompanying notes 11-14.
63. Shane v. Rhines, 672 P.2d 895, 900 (Alaska 1983). See also ALASKA R. EVID.
411.
64. P. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 131, (1978).
65. Id. at 133 (emphasis added). See also C. WRIGHT & K. GRAHAM, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5364 (1981) ("Finally Rule 411 does not prohibit the
use of evidence of insurance where it is relevant to the question of damages or punitive
damages . . . .") (footnote omitted).
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Under the above rationale, insurance coverage for punitive dam-
age awards, similar to a defendant's tax returns, are properly admissi-
ble because it demonstrates the defendant's wealth for the purpose of
assessing punitive damages. 66
Under this rationale for the admission of insurance coverage for
punitive damages, the implications of the Alaska Supreme Court's
conclusion in Shane v. Rhines are far-reaching indeed. For instance, if
one assumes that insurance coverage for punitive damage awards does
not violate public policy, a persuasive argument could be made by the
plaintiff in a personal injury action that, unless the jury exhausts the
policy limits of the insurance policy, the jury will literally fail to pun-
ish the individual defendant for his wrongful conduct. For this rea-
son, Shane v. Rhines provides plaintiffs in personal injury lawsuits
with a great deal of leverage against insurance companies. Because of
the potential exhaustion of the policy limits of the insurance policy in
order to "reach" the individual defendant, insurance companies may
be much more likely to settle a punitive damage-oriented case.
This result, however, need not necessarily be the case. As the
LeDoux court emphasized, there are collateral consequences to puni-
tive damage awards that further the objectives of punishment and de-
terrence.67 A jury may well determine that the moral "opprobrium" 68
of the punitive damage award is sufficient to justify not exhausting the
policy limits of the insurance policy. Moreover, defense lawyers may
choose to argue the McNulty rationale69 to the jury: i.e., that the in-
surance company has done nothing wrong, that higher insurance pre-
miums will result from exhaustion of the policy limits and that
punitive damages are essentially a windfall to the plaintiff.
In this way, the fact finder itself becomes the arbiter of public
policy, depending upon the specific facts and circumstances of the case
before it.70 Thus, under the rationale offered by the Alaska Supreme
66. Very few decisions throughout the country appear to be expressly in accord
with this conclusion. Indeed, with the exception of the commentators, supra note 65,
only the Kansas Supreme Court has reached a conclusion similar to that of the Alaska
Supreme Court regarding the relevance of insurance coverage for punitive damages.
See Ayers v. Christenson, 564 P.2d 458, 461 (Kan. 1977) ("Here, plaintiffs sought
punitive damages. The liability and damage issues were tried together. Evidence of
the defendant's financial condition - of which insurance was a part - was relevant to
punitive damages.").
67. 666 F. Supp. at 180.
68. Id.
69. Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 440-41 (5th Cir.
1962). See also text accompanying notes 37-40.
70. No court appears to have suggested this approach as a way to resolve the
public policy dilemma analyzed infra in Section III(C). It would seem, however, that
such an approach offers defendants a way in which to mitigate (or eliminate) what
otherwise would be the consistent exhaustion of policy limits in cases where punitive
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Court for the admission of such insurance coverage, the propriety, or
public policy implication, of using such coverage to assess punitive
damages could still be argued to the fact finder.
B. The Bifurcation of Punitive and Compensatory Damages as an
Approach to the Admission of Insurance Coverage for
Punitive Damage Awards
Once the issue of coverage for punitive damage awards has been
determined, there remains the more practical question of how actually
to admit the insurance policy into evidence. As the court noted in
Shane, Alaska Rule of Evidence 411 generally bars the admission of
evidence of whether the defendant is or is not insured against liability:
"The danger that evidence of insurance will persuade a jury to alter its
view on the threshold question of entitlement is precisely why Evi-
dence Rule 411 requires exclusion of that evidence."' 7 1 There are thus
potentially serious practical problems with the admission of an insur-
ance policy into evidence prior to the jury's determination of the
threshold issue of whether punitive damages are warranted.
In his concurrence in Shane, Justice Compton suggested a solu-
tion to this evidentiary problem:
The issue of the proper amount of punitive damages to award can
simply be bifurcated from the other issues in the case. In this fash-
ion the liability issues could be determined without the possibility of
the jury's decision being tainted by evidence of the defendant's
wealth. If the jury decides in the first phase of the trial that an
award of punitive damages is appropriate, a second phase of the
trial, using the same jury, could then be held to determine the
proper amount of the award. At this separate phase, the needed
evidence of the defendant's wealth, including evidence of any insur-
ance coverage, could be presented.72
Justice Compton's approach to the evidentiary issue of insurance cov-
erage for punitive damages is an appealing one.73
damages are warranted, while at the same time allowing the plaintiff to argue that the
contract of the insurer should be enforced.
71. Shane, 672 P.2d at 900.
72. Id. at 902 (Compton, J., concurring).
73. To test the validity of Justice Compton's reasoning regarding bifurcation, all
of the Alaska district court and superior court judges, as well as the federal district
court judges, were "polled" as part of the preparation of this article to determine
whether bifurcation of the kind suggested by Justice Compton had been allowed in
their courtrooms. The results of this poll were largely inconclusive because few of the
judges had been asked to bifurcate the compensatory and punitive damage inquiries.
See, e.g., Letter from Judge Niesje J. Steinkruger to author (Feb. 14, 1990); Letter
from Judge Richard D. Savell to author (Feb. 5, 1990); Letter from Judge Thomas E.
Schulz to author (Jan. 31, 1990); Letter from Judge Duane Craske to author (Jan. 23,
1990); Letter from Judge Michael I. Jeffery to author (Jan. 23, 1990); Letter from
Judge Rodger W. Pegues (Jan. 22, 1990); Letter from Judge Walter L. Carpeneti to
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It would thus seem that the bifurcation of the punitive and com-
pensatory damage inquiries reflects a practical solution to the eviden-
tiary hurdles posed by Alaska Rule of Evidence 411. Moreover, this
procedure does not appear to add undue length to the trial as is gener-
ally feared.
V. CONCLUSION
The decisions in Shane and LeDoux providing, either implicitly
or explicitly, that some insurance policies can be construed to provide
coverage for punitive damage awards finds broad support from both
Alaska insurance contract law and public policy. Moreover, the prop-
osition in Shane that such coverage is relevant to the appropriate mea-
sure of punitive damages has the potential to significantly affect the
fact finder's inquiry. Once bifurcation of the punitive and compensa-
tory damage inquiries becomes more widely used, the conclusions of
Shane v. Rhines should have greater impact in tort litigation in Alaska.
author (Jan. 19, 1990). Those that had been requested to bifurcate trials, however, did
not suggest that the bifurcation request added unnecessary length to the trial. See,
e.g., Letter from Judge James M. Fitzgerald to author (Feb. 15, 1990) (Judge Fitzger-
ald had not granted request for bifurcation, but did not cite delay as the reason for
refusal. He did indicate that he would use the same jury to avoid duplication of evi-
dence.); Letter from Judge Thomas M. Jahnke to author (Feb. 7, 1990) (discussing
bifurcation procedure used in Shanks v. Upjohn, IPE-86-101 CI (Aug. 30, 1989),
modeled after Justice Compton's opinion, estimating a three- to four-hour increase in
total trial time). (Copies of letters are available from the offices of the Alaska Law
Review.)
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